



After 13 years of criticism, Washington now needs to work with
Iran to prevent disaster in Iraq.
This week has seen the surprising news that Iranian and U.S. officials have held talks over the
conflict between the government in Iraq and the Sunni insurgents of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria. Christian Emery writes that these talks are a measure of the seismic changes that have
occurred in Washington and the Middle East since George W.  Bush labelled Iran a part of the
‘Axis of Evil’ in 2002. He argues that the two countries now share some fundamental interests in
the Iraq conflict, and that they will need to cooperate with one another to some degree in order to
preserve the state-system in the region.
The headline news that American and Iranian officials have discussed their common interest in helping the Iraqi
government fight back Sunni militants represents a huge symbolic break-through in one of the most dysfunctional
relationships in modern times. To gauge the scale of this rare triumph of realism over ideology, it’s worth thinking
back to what happened last time the two countries faced a common enemy. Back in 2001 the shared foe was the
Taliban. Veteran US diplomat Ryan Crocker has described how after 9/11 American and Iranian diplomats
explored ways they could cooperate in ousting the Taliban. Having almost gone to war against their northern
neighbours in the 1990s, Iran offered to support US intervention by providing battlefield intelligence and political
backing for the Afghan Interim Authority, headed by Hamid Karzai.
Crocker laments how this promising channel was destroyed by the Bush administration’s catastrophic decision to
label Iran an ‘evil’ regime  in 2002. A year later, the Iranians tried again, reportedly setting out a comprehensive
road map for better relations via the Swiss government. The Bush administration, at the peak of its ideological
hubris following a devastating demonstration of US hard power in Iraq, not just snubbed their offer but made clear
their ambition to change the regime in Tehran once they had dealt with Saddam. Vice-President Cheney ruled out
any notion of engaging Iran with the Manichean mantra ‘we don’t talk to evil’.
In the context of recent events, it is ironic that Iran in 2003 reportedly offered to use its influence amongst the Iraqi
Shia to help stabilise the country in the chaotic aftermath of the US invasion. We cannot be sure if the offer was
workable, but we do know that over the next bloody years the Iranians provided support to Shia political
organisations and militias, some of whom lent critical support to Prime Minister Maliki,  some of whom killed
Coalition troops. Iran’s nefarious influence in Iraq became a prominent feature of government and media
commentary.
It is a measure of the seismic changes that have since occurred in Washington, Tehran, and the wider Middle East
that Iran and the United States are now broadly on the same side in hoping that these same Shia groups can help
repel a Sunni insurgency under the leadership of the barbaric Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Even more
startling is the realisation that after 13 years of scathing criticism of Iranian interference in Iraq, the US is to some
extent reliant on the 2,000 Iranian troops and militia that have entered Iraq. These troops, including two battalions
of the elite Quds Forces that are accused by US officials of assisting Islamic terrorist organisations across the
globe, could be critical to the defence of the territory north of Bagdad, including the holy city of Samarra.
President Barack Obama talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran during a phone call in the Oval Office, Sept. 27, 2013. ( Official White House Photo
by Pete Souza)
This astonishing turn-around in events is matched by the fact that Iran is not protesting the arrival of US troops
near its borders. Iran’s new government appears to have accepted that America has a legitimate interest in doing
so, in large part because it has come to understand that President Obama is trying to disengage from the region.
Reducing America’s footprint in the Persian Gulf has thus become a common aim.
Obama may have sent a carrier to the Persian Gulf and just under 280 ground troops to defend US personnel
inside Iraq, but he is being characteristically cautious in deciding whether to direct US firepower against the
insurgents. There is not yet decisive political pressure on him to do so and a lot of compelling reasons for him to
resist. There is no obvious front line, no major troop-columns to target, and a very real risk that heavy bombing will
increase support for ISIS amongst Sunni Iraqis. For these reasons, Obama is waiting to see if the Iraqi army and
Shia militias will halt the jihadist’s advance. The White House knows that ISIS has no real capacity either to storm
Baghdad or make inroads into the Shia dominated south, including the oil-rich region around Basra.
Whatever Obama chooses to do, even US lawmakers who have built careers on hostility to Iran  admit that
Washington needs to work with Iran to prevent a disaster in Iraq. If Obama sits back then Iran will remain the
external actor most able to bolster the Maliki government and direct Shia militias against ISIS fighters. If he
authorises airstrikes then these same forces will be a vital source of battlefield intelligence. Whilst the prospect of
joint US-Iranian attacks is practically unthinkable, the reality is that airstrikes will only succeed if they are
coordinated with groups fighting on the ground. At the very least he will have to coordinate strikes in a manner that
avoids hitting them. In the longer term, there can be only political solutions. If the US wants to link their bolstering
of the Iraqi state to Maliki stepping down or reversing policies that have alienated Iraqi Sunnis then they will need
Iranian cooperation.
At the start of the Obama administration, signs of Maliki’s authoritarianism and sectarian bias were ominous but
Iraq was a functioning state. With the Arab Spring yet to explode across the region, it was Iran that looked to be
teetering on the edge of revolution in the wake of the 2009 election crisis. Now, everywhere Obama looks there is
chaos and bloodshed. Iraq is on the brink of collapse, Syria is stuck in unremitting and brutal civil war, Libya is
close to a failed state, Pakistan seems ungovernable, the Saudis are estranged from Washington and about to go
through a crucial leadership transition, and the Taliban are making a comeback in Afghanistan. As Trita Parsi
correctly observers ‘Washington may not want to admit it, but Iran is the most stable country in the Middle East
right now.’ The two countries now share some fundamental interests. Both are threatened by the rise of a new
generation of Sunni jihadi groups who want to break down the state-system in the Middle East. Both want to avoid
further US military involvement in the Persian Gulf. Both also want to resolve the nuclear crisis and bring
momentum to these negotiations by showing it can have wider benefits. Obama and Rouhani are ultimately two
leaders in search of a legacy-defining foreign policy triumph.
Yet there are still fundamental differences that will remain regardless of any cooperation in Iraq (the suggestion of
which has already sparked outrage in some quarters in the US). A large gulf still exists between the two sides’
expectations of how much of Iran’s nuclear programme can be retained. Even if a deal is struck, Obama will face a
major domestic struggle to roll back the devastating package of economic sanctions levied against Iran.
Furthermore, Iran is highly unlikely to end its support for the Assad regime or anti-Israeli groups such as Hamas or
Hezbollah. This is particularly problematic considering much of the sanctions legislation is linked to Iran’s support
for ‘terrorist’ organisations. Add to this a major backlash from powerful domestic voices and external allies
opposed to any thaw in US-Iranian relations, and we are left with a colossal challenge facing those who dream of
normal relations between the countries. Yet, the fact remains that cooperation of any kind would have been
unthinkable even a year ago.
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